Wow! I have listened to you and Amit on Call Me Back for 2 years now. This may be the most shocking story since Oct 7. It definitely puts a few more pieces in place….
Failed containment strategy, not moral corruption or complicity. State-level hostage negotiating, effectively. Pay or violence ensues. Israel proposes an increase, effectively saying: "Hey, we can make this work, right?" Hamas gives the impression that it will.
Hamas knew exactly how Israel interpreted the signals; Hamas deliberately reinforced that interpretation; Hamas exploited the restraint itself as camouflage.
This diffuses any notion that the Israeli government welcomed an attack, were indifferent to civilian risk, or were seeking a pretext. The fact that the deception succeeded does not retroactively convert Israel’s restraint into culpability. Warnings from the Shin Bet about the diversion of funds were irrelevant. They did not generate a viable alternative policy. Every plausible option carried a higher immediate probability of violence and worse humanitarian and diplomatic fallout.
The choice with Hamas was pay or shoot, and we've seen how the world reacts when Israel shoots.
"Qatar told Israel that Hamas does not want an escalation." This leads me to ask: Was Qatar as much in the dark as was Israel about Sinwar's actual intentions? How could that be the case, given the presence in Doha of senior Hamas officials?
Wow! I have listened to you and Amit on Call Me Back for 2 years now. This may be the most shocking story since Oct 7. It definitely puts a few more pieces in place….
Failed containment strategy, not moral corruption or complicity. State-level hostage negotiating, effectively. Pay or violence ensues. Israel proposes an increase, effectively saying: "Hey, we can make this work, right?" Hamas gives the impression that it will.
Hamas knew exactly how Israel interpreted the signals; Hamas deliberately reinforced that interpretation; Hamas exploited the restraint itself as camouflage.
This diffuses any notion that the Israeli government welcomed an attack, were indifferent to civilian risk, or were seeking a pretext. The fact that the deception succeeded does not retroactively convert Israel’s restraint into culpability. Warnings from the Shin Bet about the diversion of funds were irrelevant. They did not generate a viable alternative policy. Every plausible option carried a higher immediate probability of violence and worse humanitarian and diplomatic fallout.
The choice with Hamas was pay or shoot, and we've seen how the world reacts when Israel shoots.
"Qatar told Israel that Hamas does not want an escalation." This leads me to ask: Was Qatar as much in the dark as was Israel about Sinwar's actual intentions? How could that be the case, given the presence in Doha of senior Hamas officials?