The End of the Israeli “Total Victory”

The agreement is a win for Iran. The deeper story is what Israel forgot about its own strategic tradition

Since the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Iran and the United States, it seemed prudent to wait before writing about it — to allow for some distance, to speak with sources, and to form a colder, more precise assessment.

This post will touch only briefly on the agreement itself; obviously, it is an achievement for Iran. The more important issue is Israeli strategy — or, more accurately, the failure of one. That failure shows itself above all in Lebanon, but it runs through all fronts — through the erosion of support among the American public, the situation in Gaza, and of course through Iran success (up to now) in crafting a favourble agreement.

The American question is whether the agreement with Iran serves the American national interest at this stage. President Trump has presented a compelling argument: he has said, quite explicitly, that he was warned of a potential catastrophe on the scale of 1929 and therefore needed to end the war. When the United States decides to end a war of this nature — whether in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq — the process is rarely pretty.

David Ben Gurion. Israel’s founding fathers never believed in total victories

The Israeli question is different: how did we get from a dramatic blow against the axis of resistance — the axis of terror — to a moment in which that axis looks somewhat rehabilitated, in which Iran has won the easing of oil sanctions, in which Hezbollah is killing Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, and in which, across much of Gaza, Hamas rules and is growing stronger.

1. Yes, the agreement is an extraordinary achievement for Iran

On October 7, Israel suffered a massacre of vast proportions and a heavy, bleeding strategic blow. Its enemies watched the smoke rise from the communities bordering Gaza — the ruin, the violent savagery, from murder to rape — and their lungs filled with sweet oxygen. Israeli deterrence revealed itself to be an empty vessel. The hope for Israel’s physical destruction took on tangible form; the form of a burned kibbutz.

Israel went to war — long in days, long in blood. There were many crucial details, first and foremost the hostages; the larger picture was an attempt to restore deterrence and security. All wars are terrible — even wars of victory, won in six days, or in twelve. This one has now lasted more than two and a half years, and it is especially dreadful.

On the night between Wednesday and Thursday last week, almost three years on, Israel absorbed another strategic blow. This blow, the MoU, is not equivalent to the Nukhba invasion and the mass abduction of Israelis. And there is a reasonable chance that after sixty days the whole thing collapses anyway: Iran, intoxicated by the agreement, may overreach, and the contacts with Washington may blow apart. The agreement, for all its deficiencies, is indeed meant to remove/dillute the enriched uranium and prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. These elements carry real weight as achievements for both the United States and Israel — if they are actually implemented

That is the optimistic scenario. The bad news? Where to begin.

I have written here before that for the Islamic Republic, the survival of the regime in a war against the United States and Israel is “absolute victory.” That is the whole of it. There is no need to preserve the nuclear program, or even the oil facilities; no need to strike militarily or to effectively close Hormuz. All of those are merely instruments serving the goal of the jihad: the continued existence of the regime.

In the Israeli defense establishment they say the Iranians never imagined, not for a moment, that they would walk away with both survival and glittering gains — in Hormuz, in nuclear enrichment, in release from sanctions. “This document is not only the ‘survival’ of the Iranian regime, the most repressive regime and the largest sponsor of terror in the region,” one source told me. “It promises — we’ll see whether it actually happens — real prosperity for the cult of the ayatollahs, and above all for the Revolutionary Guards.” Last week, after the agreement was reached, Iran attacked Kurdish strongholds. It was a demonstration of resolve: not only will Tehran enjoy the spoils of the war, it will also try to entrench a regional hegemony. Its doing the same in Lebanon, against Israel.

The words “shock” and “grief” cannot capture the feeling in parts of the Israeli establishment. And now salt is being poured into the wound — President Trump’s remarks, for instance, about Iran’s right to ballistic missiles.

2. Take the question of reopening the Strait of Hormuz. This is what Article 5 says:

“Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman, to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in discussions with other Persian Gulf Littoral States, in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz”.

It is a fantastic clause for Iran. The Iranians commit to make their best efforts to open Hormuz at once, and to collect no payment from tankers. But the entire premise is that Hormuz is open for 60 days — for the duration of the negotiations. That is an implicit recognition of Iranian control over the strait. This is a wholly free maritime passage that Tehran has seized; if there is no full agreement within sixty days, it can, in effect, go back to playing with the world’s energy pipeline. The very note that no transit fees will be collected *during* those sixty days hints that afterward — they might well be.

And the Iranians did not stop there. They wrote in the possibility of “technical difficulties” during the first thirty days. That is why the opening is contingent — taking into account the removal of military obstacles.

Israeli fighter jets on route to Iran, 2026 (image: IDF)

The sentences that follow are graver: they speak of negotiations between Iran and Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in Hormuz, in accordance with international law. This is classic drafting that lets every side declare victory. Washington will say that, under international law, Iran and Oman cannot seize the strait. Tehran will say that the United States recognized “the future administration” — its own and Oman’s — over the strait, and “their sovereign rights.”

But the Iranian achievement lies not only in what is written; it lies in what is not. Suppose Iran collects no payment at all. What about securing Iran’s permission to pass — without money changing hands? On this the document is silent. If Iran controls the monitoring of ships in the strait, even absent any formal toll, it can engage in “prioritizations” — and extract the money from the energy companies by another route.

And that is only one example from the agreement. A more serious matter for Israel is the mention of Lebanon and its “territorial integrity.” Iran has secured international and American recognition that the wars are interconnected — that it is Lebanon’s patron, that it may set conditions and dictate the equations there. In Iran they say there will be no final agreement without a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

The big story is the money. The memorandum lays out a vision — not immediate, but entirely tangible — of the total lifting of sanctions on Iran. Even if those steps never come, they broadcast an unmistakable signal to the international community: Iran is back in the global economic game. Until this agreement, the Iranians were forced to sell their oil at an enormous discount to relatively small Asian refineries; no one else could buy. And the money was hard to move out of China and back to Iran. From the moment of signing this week, the Iranians can begin selling oil — and bringing the cash home.

3. Turning to Israel: How did we reach this point?

Probably, it’s a story of overreach and playing politics with national security.

Mainstream Zionism — the Zionism that founded the State of Israel — never aspired to “total victory,” the phrase that has defined Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric since October 7. The founders assumed no such victory was possible. Because “the sea is the same sea and the Arabs the same Arabs”; because they are far more numerous than Israelis are; because Israelis cannot conquer everything, and if they do conquer — then what.

That is why the first decision of the Eshkol government after the Six-Day War was that the occupied territories were a deposit, held against a future peace agreement. This was not because the late general Moshe Dayan, or Eshkol, were naive. They were far more clear-eyed than the current generation — and more suspicious, too. It came from a realistic reading of regional affairs.

With the development of technology, with Israeli economic achievements, with the alliance with America, with the Abraham Accords, and with the decay of the region around it — Israel became a regional power.

4. Then came October 7

October 7 was the moment when Israelis, stunned by the scale of the violence and murder, became convinced that this had to end “once and for all”. By “this,” I mean the belief that Israel can be destroyed.

Prime Minister Netanyahu promised total victory. Many Israelis believed it was achievable, given Israel’s regional position, the determination of its military, and U.S. support.

I think Gaza could have been “won” — if, say, a Palestinian Authority framework had been prepared in advance, an alternative armed force brought in, a Marshall Plan logic adopted, a positive vision offered: we will defeat Hamas and build a future with the Palestinians, as a future was built in Europe with the Germans.

But the current government is extreme, to say the least. A positive vision of regional peace? Improving the lives of Palestinians in Gaza? They reached instead for conceptions in the style of Joshua’s conquest of Eretz Yisrael.

“Won” in quotation marks because the government believed that to win in Gaza was to take revenge against Hamas, before or after getting the hostages back. But true victory in Gaza is a Palestinian government that hunts down Hamas. Perhaps it is impossible to create; Netanyahu did not even try.

5. Israeli Realism abandoned

Zionism believed in hard, measured work — in what can be done, and what cannot. The point was never Sparta (Netanyahu, as prime minister, spoke of Israel as a Sparta lately). Just the opposite: you fight wars only when you truly must. Wars must be short and brilliant — or not be fought at all. The IDF must not slide into attrition, and Israel must not lose the sympathy of the world.

The Israeli founding fathers did not regard antisemitism as a slogan to be deployed in a campaign. They felt its heavy price in their own flesh and saw it with their own eyes. This is a Jewish state, they repeated— and they meant, among other things, that it must impose superb restraints on itself. Because it will be watched with a discriminating eye. Unfair? Of course. But if antisemitism is real, it is worth reckoning with possible implications. This is not the timidity of the Galut. It is the wisdom of Jewish generations.

And so they did not believe in total victories. In a final, climactic blow or grand, fantastical schemes. There were deviations now and then — the 1956 Sinai desert campaign, or the First Lebanon War. A megalomaniacal strain in Israeli thinking was always present, no doubt. But it was a deviation, usually quickly corrected.

It was that caution which laid the foundation of a prosperous, strong Israel, with excellent systems of defense, education and health. Above all, it was an Israel in which — for all its vulnerability — hundreds were not abducted and 1200 were not killed on a single morning.

6. Netanyahu’s responsibility

Netanyahu’s personal attempt at this dangerous leap — from classic Israeli caution to a kind of total transformation of the region — failed. Along the way, he forgot that “another acre, another goat” was once the Israeli response to waves of regional violence. The expression — literally about buying more land and establishing more farms — captured a belief that security was built through persistence, cultivation. The Israeli symbols: A sickle, an olive branch — and also a sword. These meant building the state, striving for peace, maintaining a strong army. With Netanyahu, only the strong army was meant to remain. And even that is no longer that strong, according to the IDF chiefs themselves.

7. Some context: Israel achieved tremendous things

During this war, Israel recorded significant achievements — and there is no doubt they were necessary. These were the result of enormous investment by the defense establishment, and above all, of the sacrifice of those who fell in battle.

Israeli society (unlike it’s politics) was revealed to be strong: its civil society supportive and patriotic, its economy resilient, and its technological and intelligence capabilities exceptional.

The question is where you stop, and where you convert advantage into diplomatic and regional gain. And when you apply the brakes and tell the public the truth —for instance, that Israel will not be able to disarm Hezbollah; that the IDF’s presence in Lebanon right now serves Iran and Hezbollah more than it hurts them.

The problem was never the wish to restore security and deterrence. That was necessary. The problem was the way a reckless and obsequious government set goals that were not realistic, or pursued immoral goals it never disclosed at all (expulsions of Palestinian communities in the West Bank, for one).

The idea of “once and for all” led Netanyahu to abandon “we will defend ourselves, by ourselves” and to push for a joint war with the United States — in hindsight, it now appears, without knowing how it would end. When you fight alongside the United States, it is the one that sets the terms of the ending — according to its own interest.

8. A Reckoning

Israel struck its enemies hard, and the full extent of the damage it inflicted may only become clear with time. It brought hostages home at a heavy price and established control over parts of Gaza, as well as areas of Lebanon and Syria.

Alongside those achievements, Israel squandered rare diplomatic capital, exhausted itself, strained parts of its military, and now faces a dramatic rupture in its alliance with the United States. A state of perpetual war runs against the character of the IDF and the instincts of its commanders. It also departs from a core element of Israel’s strategic tradition: to achieve a meaningful objective, and then bring the conflict to an end on its own terms.

There is no avoiding a return to that classic Israeli approach: rebuilding the country, restoring military strength, and maintaining a credible deterrent. The alternative is an endless process of attrition — more sacrifice, more exhaustion, and more bloodshed — in pursuit of another political declaration of victory that no one can clearly define.

9. Remembering what’s important

After all of this, it is worth remembering what actually matters.

Iran has not regained its ability to enrich uranium since June 2025. The so-called Axis of Resistance is a shadow of what it was on the eve of October 7. And while Hamas still controls parts of Gaza, it no longer poses the same threat of launching another invasion into Israel.

So how does this fit with the broader argument? In international politics and regional security, much like in financial markets, the question is not only what an asset is worth today — but how the market believes it will perform in the future. And by that measure, Israel faces significant challenges, many of them self-inflicted.

The most important is the collapse of Israel’s standing among the American public. Without sustained American support, the ability of any Israeli government to maintain its strategic position would be dramatically reduced. The war with Iran made this crisis worse.

The deeper issue is strategic. Listen to Hezbollah and Iran. Even after this war, after the many thousands killed across the region, these actors remain committed to a messianic vision of Israel’s destruction and the killing of its population. The recent developments have given them renewed confidence that this vision may once again be within reach.

Israeli and American intelligence assessments suggest that Iran is unlikely to pursue a final, durable agreement over its nuclear program. The possibility that Tehran is seeking to break for a nuclear weapon cannot be dismissed.

Amid the constant noise, and amid the justified criticism of the Netanyahu government, it is important not to lose sight of the forces that drove the region to October 7 in the first place: actors committed to an endless struggle, willing to sacrifice generations for their idea of a jihad.

They are trying to recreate the Middle East that produced October 7. They cannot be allowed to succeed. That serves not only Israel’s national security but America’s most vital interests: weakness erodes deterrence, and invites rivals to test it. Not only in the Middle East.