Under Israeli law, the latest possible date is October 27. Prime Minister Netanyahu is trying to push the vote off as long as he can, because right now, according to every reliable poll in the country, the bloc he leads is on track to lose. Netanyahu has been trailing in these polls since March 2023 — more than three years now — even before October 7, 2023. There are surveys, run by the government-aligned Channel 14 and his loyalists, that show him close to winning, but these remain outliers.

This isn’t close to be over. Netanyahu — a leader who has won more democratic elections than anyone alive today — has managed to narrow the gap between himself and his rivals, and he should certainly not be counted out. Yet the bloc of parties committed to replacing Netanyahu has consistently held well over 61 seats in the Knesset.

Until recently, the most likely and formidable challenger to rise against him was Naftali Bennett. Bennett served as prime minister during the short-lived Change Coalition of 2021–2022. A right-winger and a relatively young politician (he is 54), Bennett was seen as a dynamic alternative to Netanyahu. His right-wing credentials run deeper than Netanyahu's: he once headed the settlers' lobby, he is himself an observant Jew, and, like Netanyahu, he served in Sayeret Matkal. Bennet was often marketed as a better, more high-tech, next-generation version of Netanyahu — he founded and ran an Israeli tech company that had a successful exit years ago; the new Israeli dream.

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This is the backdrop against which something substantial has happened over the past few weeks — and it has everything to do with Gadi Eisenkot. Eisenkot and his new party are rising rapidly in the polls — closing in on Bennett and his newly formed list — and Eisenkot himself is now seen (again, in polls) as a more suitable choice for prime minister than Bennett, and even than Netanyahu, if only by very narrow margins.

It is still early. But even now, Eisenkot is, according to the polls, the most well-liked politician in Israel.

It isn't hard to understand why. He isn't seen as aggressive toward anyone but Netanyahu. The fact that he lost his son — Master Sergeant (res.) Gal Meir Eisenkot, killed in action in Gaza in December 2023 — and also two of his nephews, makes it unmistakably clear that this is a man, and a family, committed to Israel's security in the deepest sense.

Even before that, the former chief of staff was seen as someone attached to Israel's mainstream national ethos. It was Netanyahu himself who appointed him to the post of chief of staff, and who was, by every account, enthusiastic about him at the time, arguably more so than about any chief of staff he has named.

Why is Eisenkot rising now?

For now, it's mostly at Bennett's expense — he has yet to show he can actually take substantial number of votes away from the Bibi bloc. Yet the trend is clear: even if he climbs at a slower pace than he has over the past two months, he can absolutely overtake Bennett as the bloc's front-running candidate for prime minister.

1. Bennett decided to join forces with the current leader of the opposition, Yair Lapid — a longtime friend of his, but a figure positioned well to the center. The two assumed that by uniting their ticket they would seal the deal for Bennett as the bloc's candidate for prime minister. The opposite happened. The move is now widely seen as a political mistake for Bennett. By aligning with Lapid, he has come to be perceived as more centrist himself, and his appeal as a right-winger running for the country's top job has been undermined — by his own hand. Bennett is already viewed by much of the Israeli right as a traitor to the cause, simply for having formed a coalition — on the strength of a single-digit number of seats — with the camp that opposes Netanyahu. He still holds significant appeal for right-wing voters, and he still leads Eisenkot, if only by a very small margin. But joining forces with Lapid has eroded that lead considerably.

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Voters in the anti-Netanyahu bloc ask only one question: who can unseat the prime minister? That is the only thing uniting Lieberman's voters on the right and Yair Golan's voters on the left — removing Netanyahu. When Bennett tied himself to Lapid, he drifted toward the center and weakened his central claim: that he was the right-winger, the only right-winger, who could bring Netanyahu down.

2. Eisenkot is seen as the real deal. In a political universe full of Netanyahu wannabes — politicians who built their entire careers in the Netanyahu era — Eisenkot reads as a man of a different generation, far more connected to a Rabin-like sensibility; the Rabin approach to the traditional security narratives of Zionism.

Eisenkot is everything Netanyahu is not. Netanyahu grew up in an elite academic family in an upscale Jerusalem neighborhood, Rehavia, where his household rubbed shoulders with that of the famed Israeli writer Amos Oz; his father was a renowned scholar and one of the chief editors of the Hebrew Encyclopedia. Eisenkot is the son of Moroccan immigrants who later divorced; the second of five children, he grew up on the periphery, in Eilat. He did not serve in Sayeret Matkal, the elite commando unit, but in Golani — a renowned infantry brigade long seen as the brigade of the people. Needless to say, Eisenkot has never been touched by criminal suspicion; he is what Israel's old elites still call "good old Eretz Yisrael" — and they mean it without irony.

Netanyahu is extraordinarily eloquent, radiating an American political style that has impressed Israeli politicians for almost a generation, from Benny Gantz to Yair Lapid. Eisenkot doesn't play that game at all. He's a slightly heavyset, teddy-bear-like former chief of staff who has devoted his entire life to the IDF. And while he worked closely and well with Netanyahu, he never looked to him as a model for his own public life. He doesn't come across as someone putting on an act or straining for effect. And that is exactly what captivates the center and center-left voters who were never enthusiastic about Bennett in the first place.

3. Much of it comes down to the electorate itself. The truth is that Israel's center-left bloc is extraordinarily fickle in its devotion to its leaders. It offers no real loyalty — unlike right-wing voters, who have stayed fiercely loyal to Netanyahu for decades. Center-left voters are forever shifting their allegiance from one figure to the next, and much of that churn stems from a single, anxious, perpetual question: who can actually beat Netanyahu? Lately, Bennett's campaign has not managed to shine brightly enough, while Eisenkot has come across as far more aggressive toward Netanyahu — and Eisenkot can afford to be, because, unlike Bennett, his claim to fame doesn't rest on winning over right-wing voters.

This has put Bennett in a difficult position. If he pivots to court the center-left voters with whom he has less natural affinity, he loses the right-wingers he needs to win against the PM. If he pivots back to the right, he may draw those voters in — but at the cost of the centrist majority that makes up most of the bloc. Eisenkot is the one who benefits from precisely this bind.

4. What do Bennett's people say? They see Eisenkot as a fata morgana — yet another mirage of the center-left, and proof that the camp still refuses to absorb the lesson that only someone with genuine right-wing credentials can become prime minister after the war and October 7. They see the former chief of staff as a tool Netanyahu will use to his own advantage, and argue that he is precisely the candidate Bibi wants to run against — one who can be cast as too left-wing. (Eisenkot once admitted to voting for Shimon Peres in the 1981 election — a notable choice for a young man from the periphery, then the bedrock of Begin's Likud.)

5. I have known Eisenkot for years, since he served as military secretary to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Eisenkot is sophisticated, and enjoys a rare quality for a politician: he is constantly underestimated. He is a deep thinker on military strategy — at times it is hard to follow his train of thought once he gets going on military history.

What Netanyahu will undoubtedly do is two things: present him as a leftist hiding behind a banner of securitism, and try to make a joke of him.

But for any of that to matter, first things first: Eisenkot must establish himself as the leader of the bloc — and that is far from certain. His rise has been rapid, and his people report real public enthusiasm; yet Bennett is a sophisticated, fast-learning politician, and he did not become prime minister without the ability to overcome obstacles. The worst-case scenario for the bloc would be that the two of them carry on an endless rivalry, cannibalizing their own camp, while Netanyahu secures another victory — or even a non-victory: a stalemate in which the other side fails to form a coalition, and so does he, leaving him in power until yet another election.

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His birthday was in October, and he wrote a Facebook post:

“I hope that after an unprecedented war, we will break the cycle of wars in Israel and enter a period of peace and prosperity with no expiration date.”

Over the past ten days, six IDF soldiers have been killed in similar incidents and dozens wounded—most of them because of Hezbollah’s use of fiber-optic drones, for which the IDF and Israel’s security establishment currently have no effective answer.

For many Israelis, the past few weeks have been an unsettling reminder of the years spent in Israel’s security zone in southern Lebanon. Back then (1986 onwards), Israeli soldiers manned remote outposts and waged a prolonged guerrilla war against Hezbollah and the Shiite militia Amal, until Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000.

“It’s like watching the same movie all over again, only this time with drones,” one reserve officer told me.

To understand the effectiveness of these drones, take a look at this footage from the war in Ukraine:

The day before yesterday, Prime Minister Netanyahu decided to escalate the war in Lebanon and attempt to strike Hezbollah strongholds in Beirut. Special instructions had already been issued to residents of northern Israel, who have endured rocket attacks and drone infiltrations. Off-the-record briefings were also given to military correspondents. The idea was to strike in Beirut because Israel believes this remains Hezbollah’s soft spot — the place where pressure from Lebanese society can be brought to bear on the organization.

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This is neither a new nor particularly original idea. But the government wants to demonstrate that it is trying to do something.

The Israeli Air Force was reportedly already on its way to conduct operations when President Trump called Prime Minister Netanyahu. Following that first conversation, the planned strikes were cancelled. A second call was more contentious. It took place after Netanyahu again warned that the IDF could strike Beirut. According to Axios, Trump told Netanyahu “You’re fucking crazy. Without me, you’d be in jail. I’m saving your ass. Everybody hates you now. Everybody hates Israel because of what’s happening.”

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A presidential statement followed, outlining an arrangement under which Israel would refrain from attacking Beirut and Hezbollah would refrain from attacks inside Israel. The leader of the Israeli opposition, Yair Lapid, wrote in response: “vassal state, fully pledged”.

Israel’s strategy in Lebanon — assuming one exists — is in deep crisis. Here are the reasons, briefly:

1. Hezbollah chose to break the ceasefire and join the war in March 2026, acting as a tool of Tehran in its broader confrontation with the United States and Israel. This decision did not surprise Israeli intelligence, which had assessed that, despite the organization’s weak state, this was likely to happen. But while fighting a broad war against Iran, the IDF could not operate in Lebanon with the same level of intensity.

2. When the intensive phase of the bombing campaign against Iran ended, following an American decision to pursue negotiations, Israel believed it would be able to turn its attention to Lebanon without major constraints. But Iran, determined to preserve its hegemony in Lebanon, made protection of its Lebanese militia —Hezbollah — a condition of any diplomatic arrangement. From the first moment, the IDF remained constrained.

Israeli ministers continue to promise that Hezbollah will be disarmed without explaining how exactly that is supposed to happen.

The Prime Minister and the Defense Minister issued triumphant statements about the capture of Beaufort outpost, historically associated with Hezbollah. But the site has not served as an important Hezbollah base. It was captured without a battle.

Most sources assess that the current conflict in Lebanon will ultimately be resolved through some form of political arrangement. At present, no one in Israel’s security establishment has a credible plan for how Hezbollah could actually be disarmed. The organization can undoubtedly be dealt significant and painful blows, improving Israel’s position and shaping a more favorable outcome. That, however, is very different from achieving the goal of disarming Hezbollah.

4. Tactical changes with strategic implications. Hezbollah’s deployment of fiber-optic drones in Lebanon is a tactical move with strategic consequences. The IDF currently has no answer to it. Casualties are mounting, and the current territorial posture is not significant enough to prevent these attacks.

5. Iran has insisted — and appears to be succeeding — in linking negotiations over its own future with developments in Lebanon, much to Israel’s frustration.

Senior figures in Israel’s security establishment say that despite all the slogans, the IDF is operating in Lebanon with a relatively limited force structure. Unlike the 2024 campaign — with its surprise blows, exploding pagers, and operational creativity —there is, in this case, insufficient forward thinking.

Even the discussion of bombing Beirut’s Dahiya district, long associated with Hezbollah, is viewed by some senior officials as anachronistic. Hezbollah has already moved much of its infrastructure elsewhere.

Their assessment is that the challenge of disarming Hezbollah will not be solved through the current military campaign alone. It requires a broader strategy — one that finds ways to activate regional levers (Syria, for example), influence Lebanese society, and combine those efforts with continued military pressure from the IDF. Such a strategy would take a long time.

But the most important point is political.

Israel is heading toward elections within a matter of months. Answers along the lines of “this will take a long time” or “a comprehensive strategy is required” are not answers that serve the government.

Which is why this increasingly looks like a waiting period — for the possibility of an agreement with Iran that could also bring the war in Lebanon to an end.

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But what is actually happening here, and how likely is a return to open hostilities? Four observations on the current situation.

1. Iran’s economy is in catastrophic condition. Essential services have been damaged, and much of its military industry no longer exists in any meaningful sense. But for the Iranians, victory means survival. And so they continue to believe they have won — and that mindset shapes the negotiations. The latest dialogue with Iran, mediated by Pakistan, is no longer really about substance but procedure. Not “what are we negotiating,” but “how do we reach understandings.” For example: should the question of Hormuz be resolved immediately — through reopening the strait, as Washington demands — and only afterward everything else, or should the Strait of Hormuz be separated from the nuclear issue altogether?

Iran is preparing for the possibility of renewed war, including ground operations and the prospect of a surprise mission aimed at removing enriched uranium from Iranian territory. At the same time, the Strait of Hormuz remains, in every practical terms, closed to the overwhelming majority of tanker traffic. Iran announced that it is negotiating with neighboring Oman over a transit protocol through the strait — a demonstration, from Tehran’s perspective, of the new reality in the Gulf, in which it controls the movement of oil. It claims to be in talks with additional countries as well.

For now, the blockade imposed on Iran by its Gulf neighbors largely survives, despite Tehran’s bombastic declarations. But as time passes, there is clearly a new reality taking shape. There is no longer any doubt that Hormuz has become the essence of the war.

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2. A central question is what renewed war would actually achieve. Israeli sources speak mainly about a desire to “rock the boat” in order to create new momentum for negotiations. They admit that absent some brilliant operation, it is difficult to imagine the Islamic Republic changing its overall direction.

Israeli officials say Iran’s primary objective is to exhaust the United States, and that Tehran draws encouragement from polling in America showing weak public support for another war.

At the same time, Iran is trying to break the land blockade on imports and exports through China, Pakistan, perhaps Turkey, and other countries. Rail routes are operating with several of these states and its volume has increased, and although the volumes remain limited, oil is also leaving Iran overland. With current oil prices, overland routes that once seemed uneconomical are becoming viable.

The regime’s main fear is not the economy, or even renewed war, but the survival of the regime itself. The purges, arrests, and executions continue to the satisfaction of the new Iranian leadership.

3. The relative stalemate in the Iranian arena has significantly emboldened the organizations backed by Iran — among them Hezbollah and Hamas. From their perspective, the picture is fairly simple: their patron survived a massive assault and an attempted regime-change campaign by the region’s strongest power, Israel, and the world’s strongest power, the United States.

They themselves continue their operations: Hezbollah through targeted drone attacks on the IDF in Lebanon, Hamas through consolidating its grip over the enclave it still controls in the Gaza Strip. Israeli military officials are frustrated by lack of operational freedom to strike anywhere in Lebanon, even as Hezbollah continues to launch attacks across Israel’s northern border — at times killing Israeli civilians and soldiers.

4. So what are the options?

The first is renewed war with Iran, specifically with the possibility of sharp and surprising operations. It should be noted that the notion of regime change is dying, but not dead.

The hope after a strike would be for a comprehensive agreement: a long-term halt to enrichment, removal of enriched uranium from Iran, enhanced inspections, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Military action — or just the threats of it — are meant to produce that outcome. This remains the primary track.

The second option is a tightening of sanctions and blockade measures, and a transition into a prolonged war of attrition. Gulf states, some of them quietly, are already working intensively to build infrastructure that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz altogether.

In this scenario, Hormuz becomes something akin to the Suez Canal, which remained closed for eight years after the 1967 Six Day War.

Most energy analysts would say that a prolonged closure of the Gulf is unsustainable for the global economy — and that’s an understatement.

The third possibility is an end to the war with no agreeement about the nuclear issue. In this scenario, the United States declares that it inflicted severe damage on Iran’s nuclear program, remains committed to preventing Tehran from obtaining nuclear weapons, but does not condition the end of hostilities on a formal agreement. Washington warns Tehran not to resume uranium enrichment — which has reportedly not resumed since June 2025.

The “no agreement” is actually a solely Hormuz agreement: Iran opens the Strait; the United States refrains from disrupting Iranian tanker traffic. The sanctions regime remains in place, perhaps even intensifies.

When one considers the approaching November elections in the United States, it becomes easier to understand why a “Let’s declare victory and go home” scenario might seem more politically attractive than the current situation.

In other words, Israelis are returning to a line heard before the negotiations over the JCPOA negotiations: better no deal than a bad deal. This was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s message to the Obama Administration.

Other officials completely object to this approach. They argue that rejecting an agreement without offering a viable political endgame risks locking the region into a permanent cycle of escalation and warfare that is not sustainable for Israel, Gulf countries or U.S. interests.

Either way, this debate is a far cry from the earlier ambitions of regime change in Iran.

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