Within Israel’s defense establishment, officials are deeply concerned about a narrative that is gaining traction in the United States. The narrative is simple: that Israel — and more specifically Benjamin Netanyahu and the Mossad — sold the White House on a regime change plan in Iran, and then they didn’t deliver. Much of the U.S. discourse now blames Israel for dragging America into the war, and it remains unclear how Israel will contend with that accusation over the long term. From the first day of the conflict, it was evident that Israel was taking a gamble with its standing among the American public — a risk I have written and spoken about during those early days.

The assessments and plans of the Israelis, in this telling, were nothing more than wishful thinking, or even deliberate deception. Much of this perception is closely tied to the exclusive, detail-laden story published by Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan about Netanyahu’s pitch to Trump at the White House.

Over recent weeks I spoke with senior figures in the defense establishment to discuss the events leading to the war. Beyond the concern expressed, what I heard was an overarching perception among Israeli security leadership about what happened — and what didn’t — in Iran.

Several points were raised. They constitute an effort by these sources to present a defense of the Mossad.

1. The Mossad’s plan included several phases, the vast majority of which were never authorized by Jerusalem and Washington. The elements the Mossad did implement — for instance, the targeting of Basij roadblocks across the country, and specifically in Tehran — were in fact successful. (According to reports, Israel deployed hundreds of assets to identify Basij positions before striking them. The Basij is the Islamic Republic’s main militia force used to suppress dissent).

2. The plan included, as was widely reported in the New York Times, a massive deployment of Kurdish forces in a broad invasion of Iran. This was thwarted by Turkey, which successfully used its influence to prevent the plan from being activated. Had such an invasion taken place, the Islamic Republic would have faced a severe crisis — forced to divert resources to suppress both an internal uprising and an armed incursion.

3. Even the opening of the war did not unfold as Israel’s defense establishment had proposed. While the assassination of the Supreme Leader and other officials was indeed authorized, other elements were not. They wanted more “shock and awe.” For example, Israel believed that in the opening salvo of the operation, all electricity in Tehran should have been knocked out — except for hospitals — leaving the city in darkness immediately at the start of the war. That proposal was not accepted.

4. A series of other operations were supposed to take place only after the bombing phase, and to date have not been given the green light (see also here). To declare the effort a failure before it was implemented — or when only parts of it were — is an unfair verdict against a Mossad that demonstrated impressive successes during the war.

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All of this should be taken with a grain of salt — and maybe two. The initial reporting did indicate that, immediately after the Israelis presented their regime-change blueprint, American officials — first and foremost Secretary of State Marco Rubio — dismissed it as “bullshit.” A senior Israeli official who was deeply involved in the discussions before and during the war told me he himself does not accept the defense establishment’s and Mossad’s framing.

In his words:

“The problem is not that the orders to execute the plans were withheld. The problem is that the Mossad said things were going to happen that did not happen. They promised and didn’t deliver.”

These are sharp words — and they come from an Israeli source. Adding to this is the fact that AMAN, Israel’s military intelligence, was far more doubtful about regime change than Mossad to begin with.

The enormous investment of resources aimed at creating the conditions for an Iranian revolution is a relatively new phenomenon in Mossad history — and largely the product of a strategic choice made by the current Mossad chief, David Barnea, who is nearing the end of his tenure.

Barnea has long been considered close to Netanyahu, but by most assessments, there has been a noticeable distancing of late.

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Deal or No Deal

The government’s outlook on an upcoming Iran deal falls into two opposing camps.

One group says there must be no deal with Iran. After all, an agreement will lead to the unfreezing of vast Iranian funds, the lifting of sanctions, and the release of pressure on the Islamic Republic. If that happens, then the war, which was meant to neutralize the Iranian threat, will only strengthen it — and especially the Revolutionary Guards.

The regime, this group holds, must be strangled until it capitulates or changes. Parts of the defense establishment, and especially the Mossad, support this position; they view the deal currently taking shape as a dangerous development.

The second group is calmer and concerned with the politics of the situation. They argue that this war is, first and foremost, about the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. If the enriched uranium leaves Iran and enrichment is halted for an extended period — the U.S. demands 20 years, Iran has agreed to 5; call it somewhere in between — that is a victory.

And what about the missile program, support for Hezbollah and the other proxies? Well, say those who support this pragmatic approach, you take what you can get while you have the chance.

Of course, it may be that none of this matters. Both camps, with all due respect to them, are waiting for President Trump’s decision. He will determine, navigate, and ultimately decide.

This basic truth seems lost on some in the defense apparatus. Israel recommended continuing the war during the US’s negotiations with Iran; that recommendation was rejected. The IDF wanted to begin taking down energy infrastructure, one facility at a time; and received a flat no.

I had several conversations in recent weeks with senior defense establishment figures; they spoke aggressively, without hedging and restraint. One explained that Iran’s entire energy sector should be destroyed immediately — come what may in the Iranian response on Gulf oil and gas facilities.

“They’re in love with kinetics, with strikes,” one government official in Israel told me. “They’re on a high. It’s the first time they’ve gone to war alongside America, and they’re trying to outflank this Israeli government from the right — just imagine, to outflank this government!”.

This is a notably different — and more nuanced — tone from Israeli officials. Beyond the obvious blame game, the deeper question is whether it signals the emergence of a new way of thinking. That remains to be seen.

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This action was not carried out under orders and was widely condemned in Israel. It will be seized upon by anti-Israeli and antisemitic voices, who show little concern for Christian communities across the region but are quick to indict Israel for every wrongful act committed by any Israeli, anywhere.

Yet saying that lets it off too easily. Israel has a real problem, and those who care about it should acknowledge it.

The previous flashpoint came when Israeli police prevented the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem — a senior figure in Catholicism — from holding even a symbolic Palm Sunday ceremony, for the first time in centuries. The police cited safety concerns tied to Iranian missile attacks, yet the church had intended a minimal, ceremonial event with only a few participants. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, confronted with sharp criticism from across the Catholic world — including unusually forceful condemnations from France and Italy, the latter a country generally considered more friendly to Israel — was compelled to issue a special statement promising that prayer would be made possible.

A week earlier, Netanyahu had quoted the historian Will Durant at a press conference, invoking a comparison between Genghis Khan and Jesus Christ; that, too, required a subsequent clarification. Now, as to the event in Lebanon, Netanyahu has declared:

“Yesterday, like the overwhelming majority of Israelis, I was stunned and saddened to learn that an IDF soldier damaged a Catholic religious icon in southern Lebanon. I condemn the act in the strongest terms.”

Here is the reality: Netanyahu was not stunned.

There is little left to be stunned by. Within the Israeli military, a deep process has been unfolding for years — the growing influence of religious and messianic currents, including extreme ones, reflected, for example, in the appearance of “Messiah” patches worn by some soldiers - against orders and army code. This has reached the point where the former IDF Chief of Staff had to personally order a soldier to remove the patch. This example is far less extreme and violent than the way reserve soldiers in local defence units in settlement areas are treating Palestinians, enabling violence towards them and/ or the media. It is, again, a problem the IDF senior ranks are well aware of.

In recent years, there has also been a troubling and increasingly visible rise in acts of hostility toward the Christian community, including violence, spitting incidents and verbal abuse directed at clergy. My colleague, journalist Yossi Eli of Channel 13, has documented many of these disturbing episodes.

Israel does maintain a comparatively thriving Christian community relative to neighboring countries. Freedom of worship is protected by law and, for many years, was one of the state’s great prides.

Yet religious intolerance is on the rise across society — and the military is no exception. The destruction of the statue in Debel comes in the same week that saw multiple reports of religious coercion within the IDF: female soldiers reportedly forced to run in long pants while their male counterparts ran in shorts during a Jerusalem marathon; another group of mandatory service police soldiers jailed for holding a barbecue on the Sabbath — officially due to a ban on lighting fires in military bases, but in practice tied to Sabbath observance; and conscripted female soldiers disciplined on the day of their discharge for wearing attire deemed immodest, with penalties including the withholding of their already modest pay. (It bears emphasizing: these are women fulfilling mandatory service — an obligation imposed only on secular Jewish women in Israel).

The broader truth is that Israeli society, after three years of war that began with the October 7 Hamas attack, is experiencing a sharper rise in hostility and hate, including on religious grounds.

The problem is compounded by a government — or significant parts of it — that is sympathetic and supports this posture. Its caution is more pronounced when it comes to Christians; far less so toward Muslims or other groups. The minister in charge of the police, Itamar Ben-Gvir, is a convicted felon who was raised in the ideological orbit of Meir Kahane, the architect of a doctrine of Jewish supremacy. Kahane was long treated as a pariah by the old guard of Israeli politics; Netanyahu has elevated one of his more provocative heirs to oversee law and order.

Ben-Gvir famously once displayed in his home a photograph of Baruch Goldstein, who carried out a massacre of Muslim worshippers in Hebron in 1994. He has made it a central mission to challenge the religious status quo on the Temple Mount, including promoting Jewish prayer at the site — despite explicit religious prohibitions by Israel’s Chief Rabbinate against both prayer and even ascent to the Mount. This is the messge of the minister in charge of the police as to religious tolerance.

The point is clear: PM Netanyahu is not “stunned” by the incident in Lebanon. His government does not center pluralism or the acceptance of the other, to say the least; it does not consistently repudiate hatred, except in urgent statements issued when Israel’s public image suffers severe damage.

Israel’s problem is not one of public relations. It is a matter of policy — and, in this case, of education. It reflects a worldview that has taken hold among its ruling elites, drifting away from foundational principles of tolerance.

I have much to say about the piece as a whole - first published under the headline “Hasan Piker Is Not the Enemy,” later changed to “This Is Why There’s No Liberal Joe Rogan”.

As to Israel, I find the argument, at its core, hollow. Is there really a shortage of rabid anti-Zionist views in progressive circles - from Zohran Mamdani to many others? Or on the Right, for that matter? If Klein wanted to make the case for a more pluralistic discourse in progressive circles, he might just as well have argued for those who defend Israel—they are the real minority. Instead, he chose Israel because it’s easy, I suppose.

Now Klein urges acceptance of Hasan Piker’s “arguments” - those heavy-duty contributions like admiring Hezbollah’s flag or claiming Hamas is “a thousand times better” than Israel.

Some of the criticism of the Israeli government, in the same paragraph, I share and write about in my own columns. That is not the issue. The problem is the fusion of fact and distortion.

And it matters, because it reflects something deeper: a conversation increasingly detached from basic chronology and attached only to sentiment. Piker’s sentiment, it seems.

As to Lebanon falsehood: With global attention fixed on Gaza, many simply do not know what has unfolded in the north of Israel since October 7. Klein either doesn’t know, or doesn’t care.

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So — here are some facts.

1. Hezbollah opened hostilities against Israel on October 8, 2023 — less than 24 hours after Hamas carried out one of the deadliest massacres in the history of terrorist attacks. For more than a decade, Hezbollah had openly threatened to invade northern Israel and seize towns and villages, much as Hamas eventually did. It was a declared intent.

2. Hezbollah chose to sustain a continuous war of attrition against Israel’s north — before any Israeli ground operation in Gaza. The result: dozens of thousands of Israelis displaced, entire communities evacuated, a region effectively emptied - with Kibbutizm and other villages destroyed by bombing. This campaign was backed, financed, and directed by Iran.

3. Only after taking significant blows on the battlefield did Hezbollah agreed to a ceasefire.

4. Inside Lebanon, something important happened during the war. Large parts of the political system — and the public — placed responsibility on Hezbollah. Calls to disarm the group (a commitment made by Lebanon back in 2000, entrenched in a U.N. security council decision) grew louder, including from the country’s leadership. Israel, for its part, maintained a limited incursion — measured in a few miles — pending a final arrangement that would push Hezbollah forces away from its border and and be disarmed.

5. When the current conflict with Iran began, Hezbollah attacked Israel again and broke the ceasefire — much to the dismay of Lebanese leaders and its people. Israel responded with a counter-attack, also issuing evacuation warnings in southern Lebanon as the area became an active war zone, and expanding operations against Hezbollah positions. Israeli leaders are floating a buffer zone — perhaps up to 12 miles, likely less — to push the threat away from border communities. One can debate the wisdom of that policy. Many in Israel do - I wrote its a march of folly. But it is a response to sustained attacks, not their origin.

6. Yet all of this is flattened into a single accusation, a falsehood: Israel as aggressor. In this framing, chronology disappears, agency is nothing, and responsibility flows in only one direction. What is left is not analysis, but narrative— one that requires forgetting how this began, and who chose to continue it.

   Once that inversion takes hold, the conclusions follow almost automatically.

7. Most Lebanese would have never written such a statement on the war, specifically not the liberals and progressives who despise Hezbollah. Yet Klein adopts the narrative of their fundamentalist rival, in Lebanon, only to indict Israel.

   Hasan Piker is really not the enemy to this text, it seems; he is a friend.

   

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Like you, I have spent the week reading many summaries of a war that is not over. Yet sources across the region warned that the two-week ceasefire was not what it seemed; in their view, the United States has no intention of scaling back its core demands - particularly on the nuclear issue and, above all, the reopening of Hormuz.

As of 10:00 a.m. Eastern time, the United States is imposing a naval blockade on the Islamic Republic of Iran, following the widely anticipated collapse of the Pakistan-mediated talks.

The blockade marks the opening of a new phase in the war. It is no longer defined primarily by airstrikes inside Iran or by Tehran’s projection of force across the region— ballistic missiles striking Israel and Gulf countries — but by a theater that has, in many ways, been central all along: Hormuz, and with it, the global energy market.

It is tempting to make a final call on this war, as we are in what looks like the end of the kinetic phase. But it is impossible to measure the results of the war now, before it is clear what agreement — if any — will actually be reached with Iran. The scope of the damage inflicted on Iran has yet to be fully revealed, though it is clearly substantial, and its consequences will unfold over time, rather than all at once.

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2. The Meaning of the Blockade

Since President Trump has repeatedly argued that Iran has been virtually beaten on the battlefield in his view, its control over the Strait of Hormuz has become a central obstacle to America’s ability to end the war on its own terms. The strait is not closed, of course; the Iranians control it, monitoring the flow of tankers at their discretion — which is much worse than closure.

That has now changed with the imposition of the blockade. Paradoxically, Iran’s oil revenues have risen during the conflict, largely because the scarcity it created in the Strait drove prices higher. If the blockade holds, that’s over for now.

Two main options were debated for how to force Iran to reopen the Strait:

*Striking energy facilities and oil fields

*Seizing territorial control of strategic installations, such as Kharg Island

The administration ultimately chose a third path - a naval blockade.

This approach avoids the direct use of kinetic force. As a result, it may limit Iran’s ability to finance its war and army, but it does not inflict lasting structural damage on Iran’s oil economy.

The possible downside lies in market reaction — particularly oil prices, which have risen in the past 24 hours. Tehran may once again play for time, calculating that rising global pressure on the Trump administration will eventually force it to back down. Yet some of the pressure now also shifts to Asia — above all to China, a main buyer of Iranian oil.

Return to war remains a highly probable option. A blockade is, by definition, an act of war—and it can escalate rapidly if Iran fires on U.S. naval forces, for instance.

3. How to Measure Success or Failure

The desired end result for the United States, according to the president’s own statements, is an agreement — and some outcomes are more plausible than others. Iran may agree to halt uranium enrichment — with enforceable commitments — and remove its highly enriched stockpiles; both would constitute real achievements.

By contrast, few expect meaningful limits on its ballistic missile program — ones that could be monitored and enforced efficiently.

If none of these issues are truly addressed — and if Iran gains any recognition of the legitimacy of its illegal control over Hormuz — then this war can hardly be considered a success.

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4. Israelis are Disappointed

A new survey, conducted in the narrow window between the ceasefire with Iran and the announcement of a blockade, captures a striking shift in Israeli public sentiment: a growing sense that the war has fallen short of its aims.

The most remarkable aspect of this poll is the contrast between how the Israeli public feels now and how it felt after the 12-day war. That war, according to the same think tank and pollster, using the same methods, was seen by Israelis as extremely successful.

The poll was conducted by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).

Sixty-one percent of Israelis oppose the ceasefire, while only 29 percent support it. Confidence in the war’s achievements is limited: satisfaction with military gains stands at 37 percent, and with diplomatic outcomes at just 23 percent.

The public appears deeply skeptical of the current trajectory. Seventy-three percent believe Israel will need to resume fighting Iran within a year.

One constant remains: trust in the Israel Defense Forces is high, at 78 percent. Trust in the government, by contrast, stands at just 30 percent.

PM Netanyahu is said to be concerned by what he is seeing in internal polls, according to a Likud insider. He chose this week to release a second video address to the public—not a press conference, a rarity in his current term. In it, he again emphasized the war’s “historical achievements,” a move widely seen as another attempt to persuade a skeptical Israeli public.

As to the war Hezbollah: Sixty-five percent of Israeli residents in northern Israel believe the state has abandoned them- according to a special survey for Channel 12 News focused on the Haifa and Northern districts. Only a quarter of respondents say they trust the government to decisively confront Hezbollah. Politically, the balance tilts toward the opposition: 38% say they would vote against the government, compared to 26% who would support the coalition.

Despite this figures, residents of the north are showing remarkable resilience. Eighty percent of respondents say they are not considering leaving the region, compared to just 10% who are.

Findings like these could prove significant for Netanyahu’s re-election campaign, as a broad sense of disappointment takes hold.

And yet, as noted at the outset, this conflict is not over; Netanyahu’s political fortunes are now tied to its outcome.

(*The survey, conducted by iPanel, included 953 respondents (801 Hebrew-speaking and 152 Arabic-speaking), constituting a representative sample of Israel’s adult population, with a margin of error of ±3.17 percent).

Last week I spoke with a Jewish American woman in the United States. We began talking about the war in Israel, and how the Iranians were expected to try to disrupt the Passover Seder (their major barrage was about an hour before the seder, rather than during).

It was just a few seconds of a longer conversation, but tears appeared in her eyes immediately. This is not an unusual reaction from American Jews when the topic arises.

Since October 7, 2023, something has shifted among Jews everywhere — a heightened, almost primal sense of shared fate. The level of identification with Israel has been unprecedented, even among those long accustomed to supporting the Jewish state.

Those who stood by Israel in its most difficult moments were, first and foremost, Jews. Synagogues were turned into command centers for hostage campaigns and fundraising efforts; communities mobilized tirelessly for public advocacy. They donated vast sums. Many traveled repeatedly to Israel during the war, joined solidarity missions to the south, brought friends, while others continued to send their children to serve in the IDF.

At the same time, Jews sensed hostility toward Israel within their own societies — and soon faced a wave of antisemitism unlike anything seen in recent decades. Unlike the period before October 7, antisemitism and the plight of Jewish communities have become central to Israeli discourse. The solidarity has flowed both ways.

As noted here before, the Jewish people have arrived at a historic crossroads: a significant threat in the diaspora — from the far right, the far left, and radical Islam. And with it, a severe security anf political threat to Jewish flourishing in Israel.

Now more than ever, Israelis are bound by a shared fate to Jews in the diaspora. This moment demands a reassessment: a renewed relationship with the notion of the Galut, and a recognition of the diaspora’s intrinsic worth. Jewish communities abroad are not waystations en route to Israel, nor auxiliaries of the state, but integral to the fullness of Jewish life. To many reading this in English, it may seem self-evident.

In the Israeli narrative, it is not.

I am not writing this to diminish the remarkable story of Jewish national revival, nor out of skepticism about the future of Israel - my country. This essay is not a call to glorify the current phenomenon of emigration from Israel. On the contrary, it is an attempt to focus on what we Israelis could — and should — have learned from life in the diaspora.

Anyone who fails to grasp that the spiritual, political, and historical character of the Jewish people was also shaped — in modern times primarily — in the diaspora, will not understand its significance to the Jewish experience at all.

Moreover, they will fail to understand its critical importance to the survival of the State of Israel — physically and morally.

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Israel’s Declaration of Independence

Israel’s Declaration of Independence opens as follows:

“Eretz Yisrael was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.”

Most of the text is correct. And yet, it contains a claim that is historically problematic: that in the Land of Israel the spiritual, religious and political identity of the Jews was shaped.

The signatories opened their declaration with this sentence because they were trying to establish the Jewish people’s right to the land. For their own reasons, they were not satisfied with accurate claims about the Jewish people’s origins: that Jewish sovereignty was realized only in the Land of Israel, or that it is the land of the Bible. They insisted on claiming that the most essential parts of Jewish history happened in the land, and essentially only in the Land.

This is simply not true.

In classical Zionist thought, the story is simple: the Jewish people, all or nearly all, lived in Eretz Yisrael. They created their entire worldview and heritage there. Then the Romans destroyed the Temple and exiled them. The Jews preserved their longing to return to their only homeland, wandering in the meantime as a people alien and persecuted. Zionism came and redeemed them.

The real story is more nuanced. Even before the destruction of the Temple, and certainly before the final destruction following the Bar Kokhba Revolt in 132 AD, most Jews already lived outside the Land of Israel. Some did so as a result of an earlier exile — the Babylonian Exile — but most chose to live throughout the Roman Empire, and before that, the Hellenistic world.

The Land of Israel was, of course, a spiritual and political capital, and Jews came there from all over the world — for example, on the three pilgrimage festivals. But the choice to live outside the Land of Israel was not rare, did not stem only from hardship or historical circumstances.

Philo of Alexandria, who died well before the Temple’s destruction (probably by 45 AD), mentions a range of reasons for the existence of diaspora Jewry: the land was too small to contain its inhabitants, the convenience of those already born elsewhere, and personal identification with one’s “homeland” — and by “homeland,” he did not mean Judea. The historian Aryeh Kasher explains that “Jews called the cities of their residence [in exile] by the term ‘homeland.’” Again, this dual Jewish identity preceded the destruction of the Second Temple and the Roman exile. As Philo wrote (In Flaccus 46) about 2,000 years ago:

“They look indeed upon the holy city (of Jerusalem, n.e) as their metropolis in which is erected the sacred temple of the most high God, but accounting those regions which have been occupied by their fathers, and grandfathers, and great grandfathers, and still more remote ancestors, in which they have been born and brought up, as their country”

This sounds remarkably similar to the self-description of Jewish communities around the world today — without, of course, the Temple that no longer exists.

Even before the destruction, then, the Jewish people — while maintaining Jerusalem as its spiritual center — had already developed a parallel life in the wider world. This became fully entrenched after the Roman occupation.

The Talmud that dictated Jewish existence is, of course, the Babylonian Talmud, not the Jerusalem Talmud; Maimonides lived and worked mainly outside the Land of Israel and under the influence of Aristotelian philosophy; the exile and the loss of the Temple transformed the worship of God, from animal sacrifices to a three-times-daily prayers.

This, contrary to Israel’s Declaration of Independence, was a central element in shaping the Jewish people’s “religious character,” in which every synagogue became a “small Temple.” Daily religious life was transformed with the end of the sacrificial service.

Later, a series of ideas was derived from this, designed to preserve religious identity in exile, distinct from life in the Land of Israel. Among these, for example, is the second day of Yom Tov, the reason there are two Passover Seders outside of Israel.

The Declaration of Independence separates the “religious” from the “spiritual,” reflecting the secular outlook of most of its signatories and the largely secular — often anti-religious — character of mainstream Zionist movements. By “spiritual character,” the intention was to refer to the national-cultural dimension, not only the religious one.

But here, too, the Jewish people’s spiritual world was shaped over millennia of exile — in the works of writers like Shalom Aleichem, in the writings of thinkers such as Rabbi Yehudah Halevi, and even in the Zionist movement itself, which drew on European ideas of nationalism and self-determination.

None of this diminishes in the slightest the aspiration of the generations — which never wavered — to return to Eretz Yisrael. But even when most of Judea and the Galilee were under Jewish sovereignty, and the Levites sang in the Temple, many Jews lived in the diaspora. They too believed, “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand fall lame.”

But it was a long-distance love. Jewish identity was not preserved despite the exile. It was, in large measure, created within it. All while preserving the yearning for Zion.

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The Two Kinds of Exile

A central principle of classical Zionism is the total rejection of exile — the Galut. The life out of Eretz Yisrael — again, a normal state for most Jews before the Second Temple’s destruction, and a matter of choice — became the source of all evil. In Zionist thought, the diaspora existence is considered a flawed, abnormal, degraded and degrading condition.

“Purging the shame of exile” became a central Zionist goal. David Ben-Gurion, the founding father, devoted much energy to this line of thinking: “The bearers of the Jewish (Zionist, n.e.) revolution in our time said: refusing to submit to fate is not enough; we must take control of our fate… not merely refusing the galut, but abolishing it—uprooting it altogether.”

The reasons were entirely understandable. Theodor Herzl discovered that dreams of emancipation and Jewish integration in Europe were destined to shatter against the rocks of antisemitism. In the end, he came to see that even a patriotic, secular French Jew like Alfred Dreyfus could meet the same fate as an orthodox Jew in the shtetl abused by Cossacks — or a Jew expelled from Rome.

Exile meant humiliation. It was the special tax imposed on Jews in the Roman Empire (used to fund the Temple of Jupiter), or the jizya in the Muslim world; endless persecutions, expulsions and blood libels; restrictions on professions and estrangement from agricultural labor; poverty that born out of oppression.

And even when a new era arrived, and an apparent age of enlightenment, it ended in the Holocaust that nearly annihilated the entire European Jewry. Even before, Zionism felt that the Jewish people were trapped between the control of rabbis and functionaries in the wretched, poor East European towns — rabbis who largely opposed Aliyah to Eretz Yisrael — and antisemites who would not let them flourish unless they abandoned their identity.

The result, many Jewish revolutionaries believed — Zionists, but also socialists and communists — was a people that had adapted itself to life inside a cage built by others, adjusting to it, even internalizing it.

Yitzhak Gruenbaum, one of the founders of the State of Israel and a signatory of the Declaration of Independence, went further. In early 1943, he blamed the “diaspora character” for the catastrophe of European Jewry, saying that Jews had preferred “the life of a beaten dog to an honorable death,” and that he felt a “burning sense of shame” that they waited “in a kind of calm, in a terrible indifference, and no leader arose to rouse them to die in resistance.”

It was a cruel — and totally wrong — judgment. But it reflects the complex, often fraught attitude of Zionist leaders toward the world they themselves came from. Gruenbaum was born in Warsaw, Poland.

Most — but not all — Zionist leaders did not distinguish between two kinds of life outside Eretz Israel: one in which Jews still had political independence and could return at any time to their ancient homeland, to live under a sovereign Jewish political order; and actual exile, after the destruction of the Second Temple, when all Jewish sovereignty vanished.

These were, in fact, two entirely different conditions of diaspora.

The first was a matter of choice. The Jews were already a global people, many of whom lived outside the Land of Israel by decision, not compulsion, while maintaining a deep attachment to Zion — a historical and religious homeland.

The second was exile in the full sense of the word. It shaped much of the Jewish people’s spiritual and historical character, and it was not chosen. It unfolded under constraint, marked by extraordinary religious, economic, and cultural achievements, but also by degradation, persecution, pogroms, and, ultimately, the near-total catastrophe of the Holocaust.

In this second condition, Jews had no option but to exist as a minority. In the first, they elected to do so as free people. This distinction is crucial.

After the reestablishment of a Jewish state in 1948, the Jews effectively returned to the days before the destruction of the Second Temple. To the extent that there is exile, a Galut, it is by choice.

But Zionism continued to treat the diaspora, and life abroad, as if it were still that other exile — by compulsion. Most of Israel’s founders failed to see that the rebirth of Jewish sovereignty also brought about a reimagining of the Jewish global diaspora.

Accordingly, the attitude of Zionism and the State of Israel toward the diaspora has been mostly instrumental. For Israeli public figures, diaspora Jewry continued to be a “challenge.” Israelis have had, and continue to have, two or three set messages when they come to the diaspora.

The first message is to encourage aliyah — immigration to Israel. This is the Ben-Gurion vision. It is often accompanied by a measure of alarmism, which can seem justified these days. Antisemitism, after all, is a chronic disease that has crushed and murdered countless Jews. Those who choose to remain abroad are, in effect, gambling that it will not erupt in their own lifetimes.

The second message is the need to support Israel as the fulfillment of generations of longing — the fullest realization of Jewish life.

The third message follows from the first two: Israel is a success story like no other, and every Jew has a stake in its future.

In Israeli discourse, there is virtually no recognition that Jewish life and culture in the diaspora possess value in their own right — intrinsic, not instrumental.

No Israeli official comes to Jewish communities abroad to truly learn from them. Not really. They come to “explain,” “recruit,” “educate,” or, at best, to “conduct dialogue.” In the Israeli narrative, the diaspora is merely a phase on the way to the redemption of aliyah.

Rather than a conversation between equals, Israeli leaders often behave like the older brother — one who left home long ago and, supposedly, made it — lecturing the younger brother who cannot leave his room and step into the real world. Where there is a state, they insist, one must immigrate to it, fight its enemies, build a high-tech economy, celebrate Purim in bomb shelters as missiles fall, and send one’s children to the army.

This is, of course, a narrow—almost childish—view.

I am a descendant of Zionist pioneers. Most of their families went to America; they chose instead a harder path- building a nation, laying roads with their bare hands, fighting and sacrificing for an extraordinary mission.

Yet it is not difficult to acknowledge both the achievement and the success of my great-grandmother’s siblings who went to the United States and became part of one of the most remarkable success stories of any minority in history.

An Israeli Jew Vs. A Diaspora Jew

An Israeli Jew comes from the majority group in his society, and moves through his country as such. He must fight external threats, but he dictates the story of his country.

A diaspora Jew lives as a minority. And when you live as a minority, if you want to maintain your identity, you need Jewish institutions (not only religious ones), dedicated education, and yes, sometimes you need to act with caution toward the majority group, lest harm befall you.

This is an enormous gap.

It was diaspora Jews — Ashkenazi and Mizrahi — who founded Israel. They brought with them the accumulated experience of an ancient minority: their wisdom, their skill in behind-the-scenes diplomacy, and a deeply global perspective. All of this they carried into the young State of Israel. Israel was founded by Galut Jews, even as they sought to create a “new Jew”— the Sabra.

But then they died. And their children — and then their grandchildren and great-grandchildren — began to forget. Within the Zionist narrative, there is no structual recognition of the intrinsic value of the diaspora experience in shaping the Jewish people; nothing to preserve this collective memory or its lessons.

“What we can learn from Jewish life in exile” usually begins and ends, for many Israelis, with the Holocaust and the need to make aliyah. This is a grave mistake.

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Education, Alliances, and Persuasion

Life as a minority across the world required Jews to preserve their identity. But it also demanded adaptability, the ability to navigate between cultures, and the building of global networks of trade, knowledge, and relationships. Those became a source of strength in the ancient world, the Middle Ages, and the modern era.

Jews developed a sensitivity to political danger; they understood that they would be the first to pay the price for sweeping social upheavals — coups, revolutions, and extremism. Prime Minister Netanyahu has claimed more than once that Jews were not endowed with a strong instinct for recognizing danger, citing the Holocaust as evidence. I would argue the opposite: the most persecuted minority in the West could not have survived without an acute sensitivity to peril.

As a minority — never able to wield power, anywhere — they developed a worldview that rejected force and outward displays of power, a tendency already rooted in early Judaism’s rejection of idols. The veneration of power was replaced by a commitment to learning and education, seen as the true beginning of redemption — first in a religious sense, and later in secular and class terms.

Jews gravitated toward classical liberal values not by accident, but because they experienced the other side of the equation: entrenched traditionalism that masked prejudice, discrimination, and hatred. They built alliances with other minorities and with centers of power, and learned to speak effectively to public opinion — because it was the right thing to do, but also because doing so carried real survival value.

Cold realism, the ability to mobilize public opinion, political advocacy, and a focus on the next generation— all were essential to the flourishing of diaspora Jewry.

Most importantly, life as a minority cultivated a moral sensitivity — to the vulnerable, to injustice, and to the layered, complex nature of identity.

Much of this has lost its hold on Israeli governance. Consider what was outlined in the preceding paragraphs: political realism, a reverence for education, sensitivity to the possibility of a pogrom, the need to build alliances and engage public opinion, and a moral awareness of one’s place in the wider world. These are precisely the qualities diaspora Jews have had to cultivate — and which are absent in much of today’s Israeli establishment.

Many Jews in the diaspora see a Palestinian family whose flock is being looted, whose door is being battered, whose sons are beaten by far-right settlers, and they see more than a moral injustice. Even unconsciously, as a minority, they sense an echo of a nightmare that could happen to them — “Hilltop Youth” cast, in their memory, in the role once played by Cossacks.

The generation of my parents, and their parents, did not see much to learn from diaspora Jews even if they acknowledged the diaspora experience — partly because for some of them, these values were self-evident. Yet for many others, their parents and grandparents — with their “galuti” (exilic) ways — were a source of embarrassment, so far removed from the myth of the new Sabra.

Today, the discourse in Israel has changed completely. People celebrate their heritage, travel with their grandparents to Poland or Morocco, and reclaim the memory and identity of their families in the diaspora. It is a welcome — and much needed — shift.

Yet it has not been accompanied by a systematic rethinking at the core of the Israeli narrative — an effort to say: this is what we learned and crystallized over two thousand years of exile, and this is what we must carry forward. The nostalgia is mostly for folklore — customs, food, liturgical poetry (Piyutim), stories. That is not enough.

The Merits of the Diaspora

While Jews in America think of Israel as an insurance policy, more and more Israelis think the same of their foreign passports. Like that famous sketch from the Israeli TV show “Eretz Nehederet” about the meeting at Ben-Gurion Airport — between those returning to Israel because of antisemitism and those leaving it because of the war and an extreme government — these phenomena are happening in parallel.

Even beyond the language of insurance and future catastrophe, life in the diaspora is not a disgrace. It requires no atonement. It carries deep value for Jewish identity as a whole. The growth of Israeli communities abroad is an undeniable reality, and the hope should be that these communities draw on the Jewish experience of millennia —one that endured and flourished, despite everything.

And as long as life as a minority abroad remains a choice — rather than the result of tragedy in Eretz Israel — this is not the same Galut of two thousand years.

Israeli Jews who come to the diaspora will need to adopt the quality we Israelis often tend to forget: humility. Yes, the Israel we hail from represents a rebirth, one successful beyond compare to any national project in recent history. It is not only about past success, but about resilience — and the creation of a democratic culture that blends tradition with a relentless drive for the cutting edge, a dynamism like no other.

But diaspora Jews represent the ability to survive and flourish over thousands of years, sometimes in difficult conditions, and above all with a remarkable preservation of their identity. They have successfully created communities with thriving institutions based on self-generated investment.

The call to recognize the deep and independent value of Jewish life in the diaspora is not a rejection or dilution of the Jewish right to Eretz Yisrael. It is simply a correction of an error — one that Israelis cannot afford to make.

A central question, of course, is who exactly the U.S. is talking to, and who is supposed to sign off on the negotiations. There have been no public sightings of Iran’s new Supreme Leader since his leadership was announced by the Assembly of Experts on March 8, 2026.

Apparently, he has the final say. According to intelligence reports, Mojtaba Khamenei is alive and, if not in good condition, then at least functioning. To be sure, he is not at a particularly high level of functioning, “but this is a man who has never actually held managerial responsibility for anything serious in his life,” one source told me, so “he would already be quite shaken” in his new role as Supreme Leader. Trump’s remarks yesterday suggesting the new leader is gay likely didn’t help.

The young Khamenei has lost his father, his wife, and his son in Israeli airstrikes. He was wounded. Any communication with him could lead to another swift assassination, and he knows he is being hunted. So the discourse with him is limited, and the decisions he makes are restricted to only the most important ones.

How does it actually work?

For their part, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian military are doing what they already were told to do, in line with the battle plans prepared before the war. Ultimately, the leader makes the key decisions, including signing off on negotiations with the United States.

In Israel, it is very well understood that this war could end at any minute with a decision by President Trump. Israel’s targets have even shifted away from centers of regime authority, towards hard military and industrial sites. Two main scenarios have emerged before decisionmakers.

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Scenario 1: Unilateral Declaration of Victory

The first is a unilateral ending: Washington announces that all its military objectives have been achieved with great success. As for enriched uranium and the ballistic missile program — America can say these do not currently pose a real threat. If the Iranians revert to their old habits, President Trump still has about three years left in the White House. He has shown America is willing to act.

Advocates of this approach are reading the political map. The Administration has thus far managed to impressively moderate the rise in energy and commodity prices. The shape of the graph has flattened after the initial spike:

Indeed, current prices aren’t comparable to the peak of the Ukraine war in 2022, when energy spikes were far more severe. In fact, the actual oil flow situation today is more constrained — yet the administration has managed to keep it in check, for now. The president’s near-daily signals about a quick end to the war have helped. But it’s unclear how long that can hold; how long the dam can be kept together with a finger in the breach.

There is another variation of this scenario: reaching a general “declaration of principles” with Iran, something reminiscent of the declaration of principles with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un at the Singapore summit during Trump’s first term. Will it lead to a detailed agreement? Maybe not. But it could create a sense of a breakthrough — enough basis to declare a sort of victory.

In Israel, it is assumed that the president could reach such a decision. However, the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia are extremely worried by the entertaining of any scenario in which Iran is not defeated. From their perspective, ending the war at this stage would abandon them to their fate — forcing them to reach protection agreements with a wounded, cruel enemy that believes it has won.

The long-term implications for Gulf oil prices would be significant. There would also be a sense this is only the first round. In the next, Iran could press for regional expansion — nightmare scenarios abound, from occupying Bahrain to the extraction of protection payments from Oman.

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Scenario 2: A Detailed Agreement

The second scenario is, of course, reaching a detailed agreement addressing the 15 points presented by the United States. When looking at the gaps between the sides, it is hard to believe that such an agreement could be reached — at least for now.

Security officials in Israel say the main problem lies in Iran’s sense of victory. Iran is issuing international statements dripping with arrogance — demanding the removal of all American bases from the region, and the collection of tolls by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz from every oil tanker (this would be an extraordinary strategic shift, one that would make Iran an official regional power).

This is not posturing, I am told — the Iranians truly believe they are winning. “With this mindset,” a senior source told me,

“It will be impossible to hold real negotiations. Because at the first crisis, they will get up and leave the room. Right now, it’s hard to see how negotiations will succeed — with an emphasis on ‘right now.’ It may be necessary to go through another military escalation.”

One security source put it this way: part of the problem with Iran’s leadership right now is that it is so detached from reality — hiding and fearing for its survival — that it does not fully grasp the extent of the damage inside Iran. As a result, it is neither sufficiently incentivized to move toward a meaningful agreement.

What fuels Iran’s sense of victory is the energy market and the blockage of Hormuz. In the global shipping world, it is reported that the Revolutionary Guards are collecting about $2 million in protection money for every tanker crossing the strait (that is not from Europe, the U.S., or linked to Israel). I was told by energy experts that the money is transferred in cryptocurrency.

Even Iran’s “gesture” to the U.S. — apparently allowing some tankers to pass — is seen by the Iranians as recognition of their new status running the strait. It is not a kind gesture in their eyes, but a dominant one — proof of superiority.

“Their feeling is that the strategy of setting the Middle East on fire has worked well. One must recognize that this is their perception, and do something more significant in the war — even at a heavy cost. There is no choice. Otherwise Iran will retain nuclear capabilities, and the war will have been pointless,” an Israeli official told me.

Needless to say, these are striking quotes, and they come from highly placed officials. They convey a sense of frustration - but not by the actual results of the military campaign.

Doing “something more significant,” is meant to “call Iran’s bluff,” as one senior official put it, “and have a go at energy. Either way — if [the Americans] try to seize Kharg or the strait — the Iranians will attack energy facilities in the region.”

The Iranians “100% need to understand that everything is on the table, including the destruction of their energy sector. Right now they think they’ve cracked the system, but they must understand they have more to lose. Otherwise they will not come to negotiations ready for compromise.”

Looking Ahead

It is no sure thing that this Israeli official’s stance will be accepted elsewhere. The implications for the global economy and energy markets could be dire. In Washington there are many — on the Republican side — who will say that it is time to stop. On the other hand, they will follow the president’s direction. Trump has so far demonstrated total control over the party.

But it is impossible to ignore the trap. Iran has taken the global economy hostage; to free it requires a strike on Iran, one that would deeply harm the global economy. The meaning of the trap: the war began over the nuclear issue but is now being fought over Hormuz.

There is another issue worth considering: the condition of the State of Israel. Israelis, according to polls, are still willing to sacrifice; but they want to know it was worth it.

It is one thing to bear sustained missile and rocket attacks across the country for a limited time — in order to win a war with Iran and attempt to change the regional balance of power. But continuing for more and more weeks on end — with the north of the country abandoned and bombed by Hezbollah, schools closed (or, at most, in very limited hours), the country sleep-deprived after running to shelters with sirens blaring 7 to 15 times a day (and night), and the economy not functioning — that is something entirely different.

I could not help but notice that this week, Fox News aired footage of young Americans on spring break on a Florida beach.

They were all in swimsuits, talking mostly about plans to do the things college kids do— well, some more enthusiastically than others — and to celebrate life. The interviewees didn’t know the United States is at war with Iran, barely knew what had happened in Venezuela, and didn’t recognize the word “Ayatollah.”

This is not the sort of link I typically post here, but the normalcy in the video is so jarring, so far removed from the reality in Israel at this war. It reveals something not noted often enough: the United States is so powerful that it can conduct a high-risk war on one side of the world while its young people continue partying on the beach; they don’t know because they don’t need to know.

Suffice to say, in Israel, that is not the situation. For young people, old people, or anyone in between.

**

I know everyone is looking for victory in Iran. But allow me to suggest a different kind of victory — one rooted in the best traditions of the Zionist project over the past century. It is not measured by enemy installations struck or senior officials assassinated. It is measured in life — in what a country builds.

In recent days, I have spoken with municipalities in southern Israel, along the Gaza border. The government has cut their budgets in the latest cycle, and they are understandably angry. Yet part of that frustration stems from something else: the rebuilding of the South has been far more successful than is widely acknowledged.

Less than three years after October 7, this is the reality: across the towns and villages near Gaza — the very places that were raided, where Hamas carried out its brutal massacres — the population is now 10 percent higher than it was on October 6, 2023, the eve of the attack. More Israelis live along the Gaza border today than before October 7.

There are waiting lists to join the kibbutzim on the Gaza border. After a difficult 2024, many of these communities are now experiencing a baby boom, tell me my friends and sources.

None of this diminishes the challenges, or the government’s (terrible) decision to cut 100 million shekels from what may be the most important project in Israel’s history: restoring the security and prosperity of this region. But these are remarkable facts. They capture, more clearly than anything else, what this is really about - and what is a lasting victory.

The major development of the day is his dramatic announcement of what he described as “productive conversations” with Iran, aimed at a “complete and total resolution” of hostilities in the Middle East.

Markets reacted immediately, rebounding on the news. It also aligns with sources reporting that Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt and other regional actors are engaged in intensive behind-the-scenes efforts to halt the war before it escalates into robust attacks on energy infrastructure across the region.

There are no public indications that Iran is prepared to make these concessions: relinquishing its nuclear program or transferring enriched material, accepting meaningful limits on its ballistic missile capabilities, or ending its support for proxy militias and armed groups across the region. The president has already signaled that, in his view, this war will not be decided by formal Iranian concessions, but by the degradation of its military capabilities — and that threshold, he believes, has largely been reached.

What remains is narrower and critical for global economy: the current focus of the war, the Strait of Hormuz. A central question now is whether Iran will agree— quickly — to reopen the Strait. If it begins attaching significant conditions, it will signal that Tehran believes Washington blinked first.

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By sharply escalating the threat of force, the administration sought to create enough pressure to open a diplomatic channel. Whether that calculation succeeds —or simply postpones a more dangerous confrontation — remains uncertain. The markets are pricing a breakthrough.

No matter how the war ends, the Islamic Republic will claim victory — as regimes of this kind tend to do. Its argument would be straightforward: the regime has survived. It has continued to strike its adversaries. And it has demonstrated the ability not only to threaten the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but to close it selectively, only to its enemies. If no commitment is made to end its nuclear enrichment program — or to transfer its stockpile of highly enriched material — this too will be framed in Tehran as a success.

On the other hand, if Iran were to relinquish even part of its stockpile, or accept meaningful limits on its ballistic missile program, this would be seen in Israel and Washington as a clear victory.

In Israel, even a minimalist outcome could be presented as success: Iran has been significantly degraded as a military. But many Iran experts would argue the opposite — that the regime has been further radicalized, not weakened.

Much of this remains speculation. The critical question is what, if anything, has been agreed behind closed doors.

Notably, Iran’s foreign ministry has initially pushed back, with officials in local media denying the president’s announcement — another reminder of how fluid, and uncertain, the situation remains.

The War’s Gordian Knot

The United States can achieve any military objective it sets — but it will take time, and the political and economic costs could be significant. Israeli officials tell me they have been signaled by the United States to prepare for at least another two weeks of the campaign. Is the United States prepared to continue for long? Perhaps. But the message perceived in the Middle East — and in global markets — is that it is not. That perception gives Iran hope; today’s postponement of the ultimatum, in favor of “productive” talks, will be read in Tehran as total confirmation. The constraints facing the United States and Israel are increasingly complex, amid a worsening global economic outlook.

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A forced opening of the Strait of Hormuz could trigger Iranian attacks on regional energy infrastructure — creating a situation in which the Strait is technically open, but oil is not flowing. In that case, the entire purpose of opening the strait is defeated.

Talk of seizing Kharg Island — Iran’s main oil export terminal, responsible for roughly 90% of exports — is at times superficial. Iran has alternative terminals and alternative routes. During periods of maximum pressure, it reduced its oil exports by 90% without fundamentally changing its policy (Kharg controls about 90% of its oil exports). Capturing Kharg is not equivalent to opening Hormuz, and the problem there would be also maintaining control of it.

Iran continues to produce about 1.5 million barrels of oil per day. The regime benefits from rising oil revenues even as it strains the global economy. Yet a massive military effort to halt this abnormal situation could itself choke the global economy — through damage to energy infrastructure and further escalation. Concerns over inflation and supply chains help explain the easing of sanctions on Iranian oil already at sea.

This is a paradox that reveals the core constraint of the war: oil must flow to sustain the global economy and the war’s legitimacy — but as long as oil flows, Iran profits and can more easily continue the war, while its neighbors suffer.

This is the Gordian knot President Trump is trying to cut with a single stroke: an ultimatum. “Never give yourself ultimatums,” warned the late Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol. Soon, we will know who benefited from this one.

Israel Does Not Expect to Neutralize Iran’s Missile Capabilities Before the War Ends

“If anyone imagines that on the last day of this war Iran will no longer be able to launch missiles at Israel — that’s an illusion,” a senior Israeli security official told me last night. We spoke on a secure line; in the background, loudspeakers in the command center announced an alert.

Yes, the Iranian capabilities are being degraded. But not erased.

“Think of it like a pot of boiling water,” he said. “We’re treating the water — and covering the pot, to reduce the effect.” He wouldn’t elaborate.

Despite the damage from recent Iranian strikes in the southern towns of Arad and Dimona, Iranian capabilities are not expanding. The shape of the graph remains relatively consistent, almost asymptotic:

Iran’s occasional successes in penetrating the missile defense system are inherent to the statistics of this kind of warfare, say Israeli sources, rather than reflecting a deeper failure or dwindling interceptor stockpile. Still, there is no doubt that interceptor limitations matter daily. There are interceptors, and there are interceptors. Arrow-3 operates in space, striking missiles earlier and farther out; Arrow-2 engages them later, inside the atmosphere, with less room for error.

“We are hitting them hard, and daily. It’s not fun to be in the missile units of the Revolutionary Guards right now,” the official said dryly. “Their situation is difficult for them —and getting worse.” And yet, when the war ends — whether in a week or two — Iran will still be able to launch missiles at Israel, he predicted.

Jewish Violence in the West Bank

While attention is fixed on Iran, the IDF is increasingly alarmed by developments in the West Bank and by organized acts of Jewish terrorism. Violent attacks by far-right, armed settlers against Palestinian communities have risen significantly. Between Saturday and Sunday, at least 20 separate attacks by Jewish extremists across the West Bank were reported, according to Israeli security sources. These included attempted arson of homes and vehicles, stone-throwing, road blockages, and fireworks fired into the air. At least 11 Palestinians were injured. One Israeli security official told me the attacks this week are unprecedented in scale and in the number of perpetrators involved.

On their Telegram channels, far-right activists openly take pride in what they describe as a sacred goal: expelling Palestinians, community by community — beginning with Area C of the West Bank, then Area B, and ultimately Area A, which is under the control of the Palestinian Authority.

The situation is deteriorating so rapidly that Prime Minister Netanyahu — who has largely kept his distance from the issue, wary of provoking his political base — held a meeting with the heads of the security services and “demanded” an end to the “nationalist violence” in the West Bank.

Last week, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir warned of “rioters who do not represent the settlement movement,” stressing that they endanger not only security, but “our values as a people and a state.” His most important line was a call for all state bodies to act “before it is too late,” since these actions “are causing extraordinary strategic damage to the IDF’s efforts.”

In effect, this was the IDF pointing a finger at the Israeli police, the Shin Bet, and the ruling coalition. The police is controlled by Itamar Ben Gvir, a convicted felon and a follower of the Kahanist ideology, who is seen as a key political enabler of Jewish extremism.

A serious question is what the Chief of Staff meant by “before it is too late.”

There are two trajectories.

The first is a widespread, violent Palestinian uprising. Elements of the far right — now inside the mainstream — view this not as a danger but as an opportunity: the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, and the possibility of large-scale expulsions under military cover. For the IDF, this is a nightmare. For ideological extremists, it is a vision of redemption.

The second is quieter, but no less dangerous: the transformation of Jewish extremist violence into an organized terrorist movement with strategic intent. In the 1980s, the far-right Jewish Underground plotted to blow up Al-Aqsa; the plot was foiled by the Shin Bet. It is difficult to argue that the underlying sentiment has disappeared, given the growing legitimacy of Jewish fundamentalism.

The IDF Central Command chief sent a letter last week to settlement community leaders, acknowledging the phenomenon as “dangerous, severe, and unacceptable.” Yet assurances that “this cannot continue” ring hollow.

Similar warnings were issued before. The phenomenon did not stop; it expanded. In some cases, IDF reservists in uniform were documented assisting or enabling it.

The Threat

This is the writing on the wall, as acknowledged by multiple security sources: Jewish terrorism in the West Bank — beyond its profound moral failure — is becoming a strategic threat. Its consequences may unfold in ways no one can fully anticipate. The political leadership is operating within an increasingly radicalized framework. And the IDF, as the sovereign authority in the territories under Israel’s control, carries a legal obligation to act — even when other institutions fail.

Why Larijani; Why Now

As far as Israel is concerned, the elimination of Ali Larijani on March 16th is more significant than the killing of the Supreme Leader at the outset of the current war. Ali Khamenei was Iran’s undisputed leader, but he was also 86; there were limitations stemming from his age. The chief executive, particularly since last year’s 12 Day War, was Larijani himself.

Formally the head of the National Security Council, this bureaucrat, who wrote his thesis on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, was much more than that. Ali Larijani’s life followed the arc of revolutionary Iran itself — born into one of its most powerful families, rising through its institutions as a Revolutionary Guard, negotiator, and parliament speaker, and ultimately becoming the regime’s ultimate insider.

He personally handled preparations for the current war and the oppression of the opposition uprising beginning in December 2025. In terms of perceived sophistication, capability, and international standing, Larijani was a towering figure in Iran.

“Beyond being the central decision-maker since Khamenei’s elimination, this is the man responsible for crushing the last uprising, for the deaths of many thousands. That says everything about him. This is the man,” officials in the security establishment told me.

There is another reason this strike is so important: the assassinations at the start of the war demonstrated deep Israeli intelligence penetration of the Iranian establishment. But they also relied on deception and surprise at Iran’s expense. The events of two nights ago demonstrate that Iran’s systems remain exposed, even after the Islamic Republic activated its emergency plans to protect senior officials.

In other words, Larijani’s killing showed that Israeli military intelligence (AMAN) can obtain rare, real-time intelligence during the war, not only collect targets in advance.

“Reaching these people was especially challenging; they feel hunted — this is the behavior of terrorists on the run,” said one senior security source.

The same night Larijani was killed, Israel eliminated Gholamreza Soleimani, the commander of the Basij force — Iran’s ideological volunteer militia — used by the regime to crush dissent and project a sense of control. Soleimani was killed in a makeshift tent in Teheran — attempting to evade an Israeli strike. “They lost their assets — bases, apartments, headquarters — and are finding alternative solutions,” the Israeli security source told me. “We managed to expose their new locations. This is also true for surface-to-surface missile units and other ground forces.”

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State of Play: A Regime Under Pressure, Not Collapse

The tactical attacks on Basij checkpoints and the killing of senior leadership are intended to deter the Basij from continuing to suppress the Iranian opposition.

Because the Basij is a volunteer organization, its rank-and-file join freely, and therefore “we’re already seeing here and there desertions, failure to report, simply not showing up for shifts. A sense of being hunted. They were attacked last night in tents — because they had nowhere else to go after other locations were exposed and struck.”

In Israel, increasing disruption in Iran’s decision-making processes is being identified. After Khamenei’s killing, it was Larijani who made the decisions —and now no one, in the West or in Iran, knows who will make them going forward.

It is not entirely clear whether the new leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, can issue orders — both due to his medical condition and, above all, because any communication with him or his entourage could expose his location.

Still, the IRGC has remaining capabilities. “There is determination within the Revolutionary Guards,” another source tells me. “They understand this is the battle of their lives, and there is still operational capability on the ground. People are willing to emerge from tunnels, risk their lives, and fire. But there are significant difficulties in command and control, and orders that come out distorted, far from what was intended,” says another source.

“On the other hand, one must look at the full picture. There is no truly senior Iranian commander who has defected or moved to another country — for now.”

This is the situation reflected in IDF assessments to the political leadership: there is no regime collapse; there are many cracks; no mass defections; command and control exist, but are highly limited and severely disrupted.

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The Strategic Aim — and the Hormuz Constraint

The IDF continues to emphasize that its own mission is not regime change. This line has been stated since the beginning of the war and has been reiterated in recent days by senior military command on the record — even after Larijani’s elimination.

A senior security official laid out the vision to me:

“The objective is to push back the strategic threats to the State of Israel, and this is being done methodically. We have work to do. Even if the regime survives, on the day after the kinetic phase [i.e. the bombing], it should wake up and discover that its capabilities have been so degraded that it will be occupied mainly with reconstruction. Not with destroying Israel, not with supporting proxies in the region — for example, the $1.5 billion they transferred to Hezbollah in the last two years. Every passing day means billions in damage to Iran and the Revolutionary Guards. The scale at which we are destroying Iran’s military industry is enormous.

“Imagine Israel waking up after several weeks of war and looking around to find no IMI, no Rafael, no Israel Aerospace Industries, no R&D, no Directorate of Defense R&D, no military industry. That is the level of infrastructural damage we are dealing them. And there is no high-tech sector building the technological backbone that will survive this. That is the depth of our campaign — and the insurance policy for the state of Israel, the day after.”

In Israel, it is understood that the central point of vulnerability in the war lies in Iran’s control and use of the Strait of Hormuz and its impact on energy prices. The consequences are not sufficiently reported: developing countries are beginning to cut energy consumption due to natural gas prices; a crisis is emerging in the fertilizer market; every day of high oil prices will affect the American economy months ahead — and that is assuming prices do not rise further.

As reported here in recent days, there is close coordination between Washington and Jerusalem regarding reopening the maritime passage. The understanding in Israel is that the United States is trying to apply massive pressure on Tehran — even amid the war — to climb down from closing the strait (it is not fully closed; Tehran allows countries it favors to pass freely).

In Israel, senior security officials say that, from their experience, the Americans knew, prepared, and planned for the scenario of Hormuz being closed. That was the assessment in Israeli intelligence — and in the United States as well. “These people,” says one Israeli security official of the Americans, “are professionals — serious military and political officials. They assessed this might happen and planned for it — and any other argument is factually not true.”

As for Iran’s military ability to hold the Strait of Hormuz, Israel’s current assessment is that most of the Revolutionary Guards’ relevant capabilities — the navy, small speed boats, anti-ship missiles, UAVs — meant to disrupt control of Hormuz are no longer operational. The cost of taking control would not be high, if there is early and thorough preparation, Israeli officials say.

The political leadership continues to assess that the United States has the ability to attempt to enforce the reopening of traffic in the Persian Gulf even without using force. One official told me, “the Iranians still have a great deal to lose, and pressure points on them that have not yet been activated, even before a massive military operation in the Strait.”

The reference, one may assume, is to Iran’s oil and energy facilities, which have enjoyed relative immunity since the beginning of the campaign — even as Tehran continues to attack those of its neighbors.

The war continues. The Americans have bombed military targets on Kharg. In Israel, sirens wail — again and again. In Iran, continuous airstrikes. including this morning.

Yet on Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal, giant tankers…

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The mood in Tel Aviv over the past 48 hours has shifted dramatically. Television news opens, day after day, with the prospect of an American strike — presented as almost definite. Quietly, many are being called to reserve service. Even the traffic feels a bit light.

This time feels different from previous rounds with Iran over the l…

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The president answered me: “We are in the ditches and we are fighting. The people of eternity (Am HaNetzach), are not afraid. This is an important visit.”

Indeed, to m…

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Last week, I corresponded with Alinejad, one of the most prominent dissidents against the Islamic Republic and a relentless advocate for gender equality and civil rights in Iran. Iranian-born and now in …

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Key developments

• Israel’s military intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, has been in Washington this week, briefing senior officials at the Pentagon, the CIA, and the White House on specific intelligence regarding Iran, amid rising concern over a possible strike.

• Iran’s state media reports that the military has added 1,000 “strategic” drones to its arsenal, developed with the Defense Ministry and based on “lessons” from the recent 12-Day War.

• Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Iran’s forces are “with a finger on the trigger,” claiming Tehran can now respond harder, and more effectively.

• According to U.S. and European officials cited by the New York Times, Washington has demanded that Iran fully halt uranium enrichment, limit its ballistic missile program, and end support for regional proxies. Those talks have stalled, with no sign Iran intends to comply with the American terms.

On Strategic Surprise

One of the topics I study and explore with students is strategic surprise. Strategic surprise rarely happens out of nowhere — and when it does, it is often not defined by timing, but by scale, method, and results. The Middle East is known for these sudden and dramatic shifts. Think of the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War — and how that conflict ultimately led to at least one peace treaty. More recently, October 7, 2023. Or Israel’s decapitation of Hezbollah’s leadership and capabilities, pagers included.

Absolute surprises are very rare. Strategic surprises usually occur not in a vacuum, but within an existing conflict — sometimes not violent, but always infused with the potential for violence to erupt.

As the strategic surprise scholar Michael Handel notes, it is common to encounter warnings that either trigger no real alert (as on October 7), or provoke some degree of alert, as in 1967 — yet the surprise still occurs.

We are now facing one such moment, when conflict seems almost inevitable. Iran may feel cornered and consider extreme actions, while the U.S. could use surprise to amplify its superiority and achieve a more effective and strategic outcome. Israel awaits President Trump’s decision, knowing he retains the power to call off a strike, even as it prepares for the possibility of an Iranian attack.

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Surprise is often the weapon of the weaker side. The weak are drawn to surprise because it offers a way to achieve what they cannot through conventional war. By taking the initiative, they seek to offset their inherent deficiencies. And the interesting thing is that even when both sides are clearly on a path to conflict — think Iran and Israel in June 2025 — surprise still works. Whether in methods, targets, scope, or timing, it remains one of the most effective tools, perhaps the most effective, for generating advantage.

When the weaker side initiates a surprise, it may achieve real — sometimes impressive — tactical gains. But its assumptions about the results tend to be wildly optimistic (think Japan and Pearl Harbor). The fundamental advantages of the stronger side usually reassert themselves and mitigate or erase the effects of the initial shock.

Now apply this framework to the current Iran–U.S.–Israel dynamic.

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